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
**ERADICATING ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GANGS IN JAMAICA: CAN LESSONS BE
LEARNT FROM A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY?**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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
**MAJOR WAYNE A ROBINSON
JAMAICA
AY 07-08**

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald F. Bittner, PhD
Professor of History

Approved: 

Date: 17 April 2008

Oral Defense Committee Member: Colonel Mark E. Wakeman, USMC
Deputy Director

Approved: 

Date: 17 APRIL 2008

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Eradicating Organized Criminal Gangs in Jamaica: Can Lessons be Learnt From a Successful Counterinsurgency?

Author: Major Wayne A. Robinson, Jamaica

Thesis: The counterinsurgent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to quell the Malayan Emergency may be successfully employed in eradicating organized criminal gangs in Jamaica.

Discussion: The Government of Jamaica and the security forces have failed in the strategies employed to reduce the level of crime in the country. Organized crime, fueled by laziness, illegal drugs, greed, and corruption, has caused Jamaica to be rated as one of the "crime capitals" of the world, a dubious distinction the nation could do without. This paper undertakes a succinct examination of the issues which led to this high level of crime and what effect it has on the country. Most notable is the negative impact it has on an economy which is so dependent on tourism and foreign investments, both of which are significantly affected.

In examining the strategies which are employed by the government and the security forces, it is observed that there has been an over reliance on using "operations", "special squads", or "task forces." These initiatives have not been effective as long term crime reduction measures. Commissions are also periodically set up to make recommendations which are never implemented in a holistic manner. The success rate from the partial use of these recommendations is therefore minimal.

The British success in the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 provides a useful essay on how the use of a wide range of civil and police/military programs tied together by unified management was used to contain and ultimately defeat an insurgent force. The highlight of this plan was effective organization of a unified effort, well thought out pacification programs, and the use of police led intelligence to coordinate police and military operations. This Malayan example is presented as a model which can be used to guide the formation of TTPs suitable for eradicating Jamaican organized crime. The recommendations made for solving Jamaica's crime situation vary greatly in purpose and scope, but they contain some ingredients thought necessary for taking the fight to the criminals and restoring the confidence of the population.

Conclusion: Bearing in mind the failures of previous initiatives, a comprehensive plan which includes the kinds of tough measures utilized in the Malayan Emergency may be required. Although persons have argued that the country cannot afford the cost to implement holistic and comprehensive plans, one thought that must seriously be considered is whether the country can afford not to.

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PREFACE

As a Jamaican who loves my country like no other, it is very heartrending to see my small nation being so seriously affected by crime and violence. In my view, enough of the crime we see is so well organized for us to be concerned that this ugly phenomenon has taken root. A number of initiatives undertaken by the government and the security forces to deal with the situation have had only marginal success. Many times the strategies are decried as being too narrow or not having gone far enough. This study is especially of value to me as a member of the Jamaica Defence Force, a military organization whose daily mandate includes assisting the civil authority (the Jamaica Constabulary Force) in the maintenance of law and order.

In this paper I assess some approaches which, although they or similar ones may have been partially attempted, have never been done in a holistic manner. I will also study the reasons why various strategies employed to undo criminal gangs have only had partial success and examine the likelihood of greater gains being achieved through the use of successful counterinsurgency tactics and methods. I shall also examine an insurgency which was defeated and use it as a guide to make suggestions on how Jamaica may eradicate criminal gangs.

This project could not have been successfully undertaken without the assistance and support of some persons whom I must acknowledge. Thanks to Dr Donald F. Bittner, my MMS mentor, for his invaluable guidance and assistance throughout the research process. I would also like to thank my Faculty Advisors, Commander Joseph E. Arleth, USN, and Dr Douglas E. Streusand, who guided my conference group throughout the year. Finally I would like to thank my wife, Tracy-Ann, and my sons, Nathan and Giovanni, for their love and understanding during the many hours I spent on this paper, sometimes denying them the attention they deserve. Thank you guys, I love you.

INTRODUCTION

A scourge of crime and violence that has become endemic in certain urban centers across the island of Jamaica and in recent years has now shifted to some of the more sedate suburban and rural communities previously thought to be immune. The frightening crime statistics sometimes creates fear not only in the minds of residents but also in would be investors and businessmen, returning residents, and tourists seeking to have an enjoyable time in our island paradise. A number of initiatives employed by the government and the security forces to deal with crime and criminals have had only limited success. In this paper I shall examine why various strategies employed to undo criminal gangs have not been more successful. Using the framework of analysis presented by O'Neill in his book, *"Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse"* (2005), I will examine how the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 was defeated. This will then be used as a guide to make suggestions on how the Jamaican government could eradicate criminal gangs.

These opening statements are not meant to give the impression that Jamaica is an unsafe country with crime on every street corner. However, it would be disingenuous not to accept and acknowledge that crime presents a challenge to law enforcement officials and the government. It is therefore intended that this document will first conduct a review of the prevalence of criminal gangs in Jamaica and their effect/involvement in crime and violence. What are their modus operandi, how are they armed and funded, and why their members are so hard to capture, prosecute and convict? I will then look at the methods used in a successful counterinsurgency and evaluate its suitability for use in the fight against gang violence. In the final analysis the objective of this paper is to answer the following basic question: Can the counterinsurgent

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to quell the Malayan Emergency be successfully employed in eradicating organized criminal gangs in Jamaica?

CRIME IN JAMAICA

Jamaica was once viewed as one of the most desirable islands in the Caribbean in which to live or visit. This status is presently in doubt however, in large part due to the existing security challenges caused by crime and violence. There is a widely held belief that chief among the reasons for this is a "get rich quick" mentality and greed. Unless one is involved in illegal activities, the get rich quick mindset is unfeasible in an economy beset by high unemployment rates, real and or perceived widespread corruption, a high crime rate, a high trade deficit, and falling level of international investments.

Reasons

In my experience if you ask the average Jamaican what is his/her view on the reasons for the level of crime and violence, they are likely to reply with a number of different answers. These may include unemployment and unemployable youths, corruption, turf warfare, the illegal drug trade, inequality between the rich and the poor, the get rich quick mentality, and greed. Though this would not be an exhaustive list, and some of the factors may be interrelated, it should certainly capture the significant causes.

Jamaica's unemployment rate, which has fallen a total of about 5% in approximately 15 years, averaged 10.7 % between January 2005 and April 2007.¹ This is undoubtedly a contributor to the situation. The high unemployment rate exacerbates the serious crime problem, including gang violence fueled by the drug trade.² The view is often expressed that the youths are unable or unwilling to work as they are unqualified educationally for meaningful employment or they are simply uninterested. A number of the persons falling into this category, especially males, are

very vulnerable and are prone to illegal means of earning a living. They are easily inveigled by criminal gangs to become involved in scams or to undertake illegal or criminal activities in order to survive. Without positive role models they are especially at risk.

The presumption of being corrupt, real or perceived, is one of the curses with which Jamaicans have to grapple in many spheres. Jamaica was rated 84th of 179 countries on Transparency International's corruption perception index for 2007.³ This is a slight fall from 63rd of 163 countries the previous year.⁴ There appears to be much public tolerance towards "beating the system", which may be a contributor to this perception. It also causes many persons to become indifferent towards the efforts of institutions involved in the anti-corruption fight. Some even view most anti-corruption organizations with cynicism and are therefore unwilling to engage in the war against corruption.

Petty, political, and narcotics related corruption are prevalent in Jamaica, which undermines the country's long established democracy and retards its prospect for economic development.⁵ The use of one's business or political position for illicit small scale benefit is perceived to be widespread in these persons interaction with the populace. Over time some persons in these positions of authority turn the illegal or corrupt activities into large endeavors, thus corrupting many others in the process. When one looks at the cases in which arrests are made, it is clear that some of the more common areas affected are the police traffic department, customs department, registrar general's department (births, deaths, marriages etc.), and the department responsible for issuing of motor vehicle and driver's licenses.

Jamaica is a major transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for North America and Europe. It is also the Caribbean's largest cultivator and exporter of cannabis (ganja). The country ranks in the top 20 in terms of global seizures of cocaine. It is estimated that

up to 100 metric tons of cocaine, with a London (England) street value of approximately US\$5 billion, is transshipped through Jamaica.⁶ In what way is all of this related to corruption or organized crime in Jamaica?

To successfully conduct this level of illicit activities a large network of intermediaries undoubtedly has to be corrupted. This, by necessity, will have to include port workers, custom officers, policemen, security guards, airline crews, and fishermen. Because of the large quantities of money involved in this endeavor, it is easy to see why there is the potential for many episodes of criminal activities. Political scientists in the Department of Government at The University of the West Indies, Professor Trevor Munroe et al, in the publication "*Weapon in the Fight Against Corruption*" states, "The frequency and intensity of violent turf wars and reprisal killings among drug gangs is testimony to the extent of narcotics related corruption in Jamaica."⁷

Corruption related to giving or obtaining political favours is also a regular occurrence. This takes place when the political party or their functionaries at various levels, with access to scarce resources, reward their supporters with a disproportionate share. At the same time, they may penalize the supporters of opposing parties by denying them access to such benefits. These actions lead to frequent conflict among the rivals to gain control of turf. This turf may be vital, as depending on its location, it may allow greater access to benefits. Political corruption is also manifested in public procurement systems where contracts are sometimes not awarded solely on merit; rather, these may be used as a reward for party support and in return for political contributions. The disposal of public assets, appointments of public officers, and offers of employment are also sometimes politically tainted.

As a military officer in the Jamaica Defence Force for almost 20 years, turf warfare is one of the most destructive forms of crime and violence I have witnessed. This is especially so in

garrison communities. These are normally ghetto communities affiliated to one of the two main political parties. They are affected by comparatively higher than normal crime rates. However, when the security forces attempt to investigate they are confronted with a wall of silence. There exists mutual distrust between the police and these community members, hence criminal acts there are generally difficult to solve and prosecute. Relatively, these are the areas which suffer the most reprisal killings or other forms of retribution.⁸

Persons who do not belong to these communities venture into them at great personal risk. They normally contain below standard amenities, and both the government and the private sector avoid them for the establishment of businesses or other forms of investment. A major source of contention leading to violence between rival garrison communities is related to the extortion rackets in which they are involved. It is an open secret that they target all businesses within close proximity as well as public transportation operators and contractors operating within or near their garrison.⁹ The ways in which these communities organize themselves to conduct these extortions and enrich their leaders, while ostensibly caring for needy community members is one of the best examples of organized crime at work in Jamaica.

Jamaica's challenges with the illegal drug trade may be seen as emanating from two situations. The country's location makes it a preferred transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for North America, as well as its dubious distinction as the largest Caribbean cultivator and exporter of ganja (marijuana).¹⁰ The ability to earn large incomes from this activity, relatively quickly, and with less work, makes it an attractive venture - but one that is also prone to violent and bloody criminality. The illegal drug trade also provides, the persons involved with the means to buy power and influence, so they may become "untouchables".

Many Jamaicans are quite cynical about the difference in treatment meted out to persons of different social standing. It is often seen that the higher the social status of an individual, the less likely he/she is to be found guilty of an offence or the lighter their sentence if they are convicted. The more affluent an accused, the better is his/her ability to employ high profile lawyers for their defense. This situation causes many in the lower levels of the social strata to feel they will not get justice from the courts in issues for which they seek redress. It often results in them being very disillusioned with the justice system.¹¹

It is my perception that the get rich quick mentality and greed, which has been prevalent in Jamaica for quite a while, provides an ideal environment for crime and violence to flourish. These mentalities are root causes for all the issues mentioned above. From the corruption and bribes used by politicians and others, to the illegal drug trade and the extortion rackets, to financial fraud, robberies, vehicle theft, and investments made in various get rich quick pyramid and investment schemes, they all point to greed, which drives the desire to be rich now.

EFFECTS OF CRIME ON THE NATION

Despite many promises, especially by political leaders, to bring crime and violence under control, this has proven easier said than done. Their inability and the failure of the security forces, to bring about any meaningful and sustained reduction have resulted in increased anxiety on the part of the populace. The number of murders committed in Jamaica has increased from 469 in 1989 to 1,674 in 2005, for a murder rate of 64.10 per 100,000 people. Jamaica had the dubious distinction of having the highest murder rate per capita in the world in that year. In 2006 there were 1340 homicides and in 2007 there were 1574.¹² The country has consistently remained in the top five for homicide rates in the world.

In every survey conducted in Jamaica, seeking to ascertain the most pressing concerns to locals, the rate of crime and violence far supersedes any other response. Normally, the second greatest concern is the poor state of the economy.¹³ There are many who believe this is not a coincidence, as the level of safety and security experienced in a country has an effect on its business and investment climate.¹⁴ It is debatable as to whether or not the reverse is also true. Ironically while many Jamaicans will express concerns about the high rate of crime and violence, there is also a sense that very few are willing to assist the security forces in ways that could bring perpetrators to justice.

Crime and violence have a debilitating effect on the country as it remains a major impediment to development. Security challenges are posing serious social and economic challenges for all Caribbean economies, particularly those heavily dependent on tourism. It undermines growth, threatens human welfare, and is a hindrance to social development.¹⁵ Feedback from persons who have visited Jamaica is that, prior to visiting, their impression was of a very unsafe place. This is apparently a widely held international view of the country.

The crime situation also has another type of negative effect on the economy. As the rate of crime increases and access to financing decreases, spending on security by government, the private sector, and even private individuals increase. In the meantime worker productivity declines. The country cannot ignore the problem, but to address it means that limited financial resources must be diverted from other sectors such as education and health. The perpetrators of these crimes appear unconcerned and uncaring about the situation and may even be oblivious to the effects of their actions. Interestingly lower levels of criminality could have untold positives for the Jamaican economy as estimates suggest that reducing the homicide rate by one third from its current level could more than double the country's rate of per capita economic growth.¹⁶

As expressed almost daily, in the print and electronic media, the level of desperation and hopelessness felt by many Jamaicans, as they see the rate of crime spiraling upwards is quite high. The daily radio talk shows and the print media are bombarded with the howls of fear and trepidation. One of the regularly mooted reasons for this level of disquiet is an unsettling fact: despite the number of initiatives attempted to curtail crime, it appears to have taken on a life of its own. So bad is the situation that any announcement of a new anti-crime initiative is responded to, especially on these radio talk shows, with much skepticism.

STRATEGIES ATTEMPTED TO ERADICATE CRIME

It is obvious that the government of Jamaica recognizes that the crime and violence problem is not only a security issue. Many of the challenges are caused or affected by the social and economic policies of previous and current administrations, and so it has to take the lead in any measures aimed at solving it. The government and the hierarchy of the security forces have embarked on a number of initiatives aimed at reducing the crime problem. These, however, have had short-lived, and ultimately very little success.

A critical aspect of any strategy to rid Jamaica of organized crime has to be the focus on the criminal's *centre of gravity*. This centre of gravity, I believe, is the support they get from an indifferent and passive populace. There is a sense among many persons with whom one speaks, and which is borne out in the sentiments expressed in the media, that many Jamaicans are apathetic to the level of criminality in the country. Many will speak about it and say they detest it, but they openly indicate an unwillingness to "get involved" in attempts to fix the problem. This may also be an indication of the government's failure in the use of the "I" in the instruments of national power. Extensive use of judicious information operations is necessary for winning this battle.

The strategies always seem to suffer from a failure to receive the buy-in of the citizens due to the cynicism with which they view the issue. This skepticism disinclines the public in supporting initiatives to reduce corruption and crime. Another reason for the failure of these attempts is the piecemeal manner in which the approaches are implemented. A holistic approach of community policing, government social intervention in poor communities, job creation, timely prosecution of offenders, weeding out corrupt police officers and other officials, stemming the flow of illegal drugs in and out of the island, and stopping the entry of illegal guns has not been attempted.

The government becomes particularly active when there is a public outcry regarding the crime situation. One of the methods used on these occasions is to establish a commission of inquiry or some other form of investigating body to make recommendations on a course of action to be taken.¹⁷ Even though these may include the need for a comprehensive approach so public confidence can be restored, only one or a few of the recommendations are implemented at a time.

An example of this is; the government's "Wolfe Commission" of 1993, a committee chaired by Justice Lensley Wolfe. Its task was to make recommendations on how to stem the persistent crime wave. In its "Report of the National Task Force on Crime," the commission made several comprehensive recommendations. By 2006, 13 years later many of the recommendations were still not implemented. Those that had been, lacked proper management and oversight, thereby achieving only limited success.¹⁸

Another practice of the government and the security forces is to establish a new police "task force," "special squad," or "operation."¹⁹ In the short term these sometimes have had some minor successes; however, like their predecessors, these gains are always negligible and brief. Experience has shown that when the desired positive results are not forthcoming, the combined

effect of minimal success coupled with desperation and frustration leads to unprofessional conduct. This is often manifested in police excesses and abuse.

When these special initiatives are implemented, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (police), which has the responsibility for crime solving, is usually assisted for certain tasks by the Jamaica Defence Force (military). As a military officer for almost 20 years, I have always seen the Forces operate jointly in these missions. The activities they typically undertake are cordon and searches, curfews, raids, foot patrols, mobile patrols, and flag marches in troubled areas to curtail criminality. The police always have primacy in these operations.

The most challenging tasks for the government in undertaking a wide-ranging approach, of the type mentioned above, is implementing social interventions, job creation, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and weapons. These are particularly challenging because meaningful social intervention and job creation requires vast quantities of resources, especially money, which the government is challenged to find, either through its own assets or private investment inflows.

Stemming the flow of illegal drugs and guns is also quite difficult. This is due to the country's location, the attraction created by the ratio of supply and demand, and the potential to make vast sums of money quickly. The openness of Jamaica's borders also presents a daunting task for the local coast guard and the marine police to patrol. Fishing is a large industry in Jamaica, and the island's openness make it is impossible and impractical to check every small vessel arriving in or leaving the country. On numerous occasions when the police arrest persons accused of undertaking these types of illegal activities, they report that it is via these open routes that the contraband was being transported. The effect of the havoc wreaked on the country by criminals using these illegal weapons has left a scar on many citizens. The actions of some of these offenders bear similarities to the activities often associated with insurgents.

CRIME IN JAMAICA COMPARED TO INSURGENCY

Organized crime has now taken root in Jamaica. Organized crime is, however, different from an insurgency. An insurgency is defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.²⁰ Thus insurgencies and insurgents, who will ultimately seek to seize power, normally have more broad reaching focus and their operatives tend to adopt a more militant approach in organization and execution.

Modern insurgents are generally more interested in having their cause accepted by the populace as being legitimate. For this reason, they often appeal to the public conscience and seek to portray their actions as being aimed at obtaining good governance. Another claim is that their aim is to secure a better standard of living for their nation's poor and changing the society for the better. They are also often viewed as common criminals by the states in which they operate because they are prone to using extreme violence to achieve their objectives. This can be an extremely costly error. Criminals, on the other hand are usually not as 'noble' in their intentions. They are more interested in gaining personal riches rather than ensuring the greater good of their community. Normally their goal is not the seizure of power in a state.

Despite these differences in their *modus operandi* and focus, there is one fundamental similarity which is at the heart of this thesis. It relates to their ability and willingness to be extremely violent and the fact that, for this reason, both organized criminals and insurgents are equally seen as undesirables and enemies of any democratic and lawful state. A number of nations have in the last 150 years had to deal with countering insurgencies. Some insurgencies

were very difficult to defeat and, often it took very bold, courageous, and unorthodox methods to put them down. An example is the British experience in Malaya after the Second World War.

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: HOW IT WAS DEFEATED

A study of the Malayan Emergency provides valuable insight on the use of a wide range of civil and police/military programs tied together by unified management, to contain and ultimately defeat a modern insurgent force. The British and Malayan government's response, as articulated by Field Marshal, Sir Michael Carver, in "*War Since 1945*" will therefore be the focus of this section. Bard E. O'Neill, in his book, "*Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*" (2005), suggests a framework of analysis of Environment, Popular Support, External Support, and Organization and Cohesion²¹ when analyzing how insurgencies can be defeated. O'Neill's suggested framework of analysis will form the basis on which Carver's report will be examined.

The Malayan Emergency started in 1948 and was not brought to an end until 1960. Like many other insurgent movements in Asian colonies under the control of Western powers, the Malayan insurgency grew out of the anticolonial movements of the 1920s. It took the Russian Revolution as its source of inspiration.²² The Malayan situation was, however, somewhat different: from the outset the Communist movement there was almost exclusively drawn from the Chinese minority residing amidst a Malay majority population. It never gained much support from the Malayan or Indian elements of Malaya's polyglot society, which critically limited its appeal.²³

Environment

In assessing the role the environment can play, the aim is to examine the terrain, its physical attributes, and how using it tactically, operationally, and strategically can enhance or

hinder the success of the insurgents or counterinsurgents. Despite the better training of a highly skilled military force, and the expectation that they will be capable of adapting to the most difficult of terrain, insurgents have on occasion used very challenging terrain to inflict humiliating defeat on them. As Clausewitz noted in his classic "*On War*", the greater the surface of contact the thinner the forces will have to be spread [and] the greater the resistance in a general uprising.²⁴

The Malayan peninsula is characterized by a largely similar landscape in that both the east and west feature coastal plains rising to often densely forested hills and mountains. These central jungle areas provided most of the safe havens for the insurgents during the Emergency. They lived mainly along the outskirts or just inside these jungles, within reach of the *Min Yuen*, Chinese squatter communities. Another significant feature of the Malayan environment is that the ownership class was mainly English. They lived far and wide across the land where they operated tin mines and rubber plantations. This made them vulnerable to extortion, kidnapping, or attacks from the insurgents.

The terrain provided challenges for the British and Malayan forces as they tried to eliminate the insurgents. The forces were especially tested in the early years of their operations. To overcome the challenges they had to, over time, modify and increase training, improve intelligence gathering, and draw on the knowledge of police and military personnel who had suitable experience in other places (e.g. Palestine). Eventually their performance did improve notably. The vulnerability of the economy which was heavily dependent on the mines and plantations needed close protection. The shortage of personnel to sweep, clear, and keep clear the swept area, and the lack of reliable intelligence led to the creation of new paramilitary groups. At the peak of their strength these paramilitaries numbered over 200,000.²⁵

Popular Support

A very important necessity for the success of any insurgency is the level of popular support it receives. Insurgencies which have enjoyed long periods of "success" are always the ones which have been able to win the "hearts and minds of the people". Among the techniques used to gain popular support is creating mayhem, and then portray the authorities as being incompetent if they fail to quell the disorder. The supposed incompetence is manifested in the government and security forces inability to provide security for the populace. On the other hand the authorities are viewed as repressive if their actions appear draconian. Very crucial to defeating an insurgency therefore, is the manner in which the government responds to these techniques.

In the case of the Malayan Emergency, the Communist insurgents received much support from the Chinese squatter communities, the *Min Yuen*, which had been formed on the outskirts of many jungle areas. The insurgents lived in the jungles and depended on these communities for food, money, recruits, and intelligence. As these communities, and the support it members provided, were the insurgents *center of gravity*, a wedge had to be driven between the two. This was done under what became known as the Briggs Plan. Among many other actions, they resettled the squatters into "New Villages", registered and gave them identification cards, and employed very strict food control and food denial operations against the insurgents. As the other side of the carrot-and-stick approach, the government undertook a variety of political, economic, and social measures accompanied by an information campaign to win the "hearts and minds."²⁶

External Support

External support may be received by either an insurgent group in their effort to sustain themselves or the counterinsurgents in their effort to put down the rebellion. Whichever group

receives the support, it is an important factor in assessing how the government may achieve success. Careful examination of appropriate responses must be given, particularly if it is in the form of material aid and sanctuaries, and since it will probably involve a foreign state or persons/groups resident in a foreign country. If external support is important and military measures are deemed unwise, one option is to rely on diplomacy.²⁷

Thankfully for the British and Malayan government and their forces, the insurgents received almost no external assistance. "They were all fortunate that their opponents received very little help of any kind from outside the country."²⁸

Organization and Cohesion

In order for a government to increase its chances of success in fighting against insurgents, it is necessary to ensure their systems, programs, and the tactics used by their forces in the field is properly organized and administered. It is even more essential, however, that the insurgent's organization and cohesion is systematically disrupted to make them easier to defeat. Programs with the best potential to bring about meaningful change will not be successful without good security and honest administrators. "Successful government campaigns to undermine insurgents efforts to obtain, maintain or increase popular support are closely associated both with a program to address the needs of the people and with administrative competence and capability."²⁹

In the Malayan Emergency, organization and cohesion of the British/Malay administrative structures and their forces played a most vital role in their eventual success over the insurgents. The army was keenly aware that the problem was not going to be solved by military operations alone, nor even primarily by them.³⁰ While the army concentrated on dealing with the insurgents, the civil administration and the police had to create an administrative, political, and security climate which would cut off the insurgents support in the population.³¹

There were organization and cohesion challenges at the start of the Emergency. The police and military organizations were under strength and disorganized. The intelligence gathering apparatus was also weak, thus providing only limited actionable information. Above all there was the need for a better organization to direct the entire machinery of government and of operations as one whole.³²

The remedy for this situation commenced with the appointment of a Director of Operations in 1950 to act under the High Commissioner. His task was not just to coordinate, but also to direct all measures, civil and military, and to prosecute the campaign against the insurgents and their supporters, the Min Yuen.³³ To put this plan together, retired Lieutenant General, Sir Harold Briggs was appointed. He chaired the newly created War Council; the other members being the army and air force commanders, the Police Commissioner, and the Secretary of Defence.³⁴

Despite Briggs' best efforts and the development of the Briggs Plan, organization and cohesion came slowly. Many of his ideas were therefore not implemented until after he retired in 1952. By then a new British government took organization and cohesion a step further by appointing a single person as High Commissioner and Director of Operations, thus creating a unified civil-military command structure. Through this new structure the police and military intelligence apparatus were combined to function more effectively. Several of the new command and other elements that were formed at the higher level in this period were replicated at the provincial and district levels.³⁵

The combined actions of the governments of Britain and Malaya, along with those of the police and military, signified that they understood, even if belatedly, that business as usual would not achieve the success they sought. One of the most significant steps taken by the British

government, which signified their understanding of the political issues, was their decision to allow Malayan independence.

Concluding Comment

It is very clear that the environment of the conflict, the popular support gained by the insurgents, the external support received by both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents, and the organization and cohesion of the administrative and security functions played a significant role in the outcome of the Malayan Emergency. Quite obviously though, the areas requiring the greatest effort were those aimed at taking away the insurgents popular support, and that aimed at organizing a cohesive civil and police/military management apparatus.

Importantly in this situation the government recognized, even if belatedly, the need to address the issues which gave the insurgents their popular support. Taking steps to tackle economic, social and political problems appeased many who initially supported the insurgents and caused them to switch allegiance thus reducing the rebels support base. The applicability of this chapter, assessing the Malayan Emergency, will now be applied to Jamaica's crime situation.

CAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES WORK IN JAMAICA?

Counterinsurgency strategies of the type used in Malaya could not be employed in Jamaica in the exact manner it was done there. Many of the TTPs used may have been necessary due to the manner in which the insurgent struggle started, their eventual *modus operandi*, and the lack of preparedness on the part of the government. The insurgents used their grouses with the government of the day to instigate attacks against the state and its institutions. After being overwhelmed by the superior power and organization of the government military and police forces, they migrated to more remote areas and commence actions as a guerrilla force.

While those counterinsurgency strategies could not be used in Jamaica exactly as it was done in Malaya, it can provide a point of departure for understanding what could be possible if these TTPs are adopted and modified to fit the unique situation that crime and violence presents. An insurgency and organized crime are different in many respects. Despite this, however, there is one fundamental similarity which makes it useful to study counterinsurgency techniques when seeking solutions for a crime situation like that in Jamaica. This relates to the ability and willingness of both organized criminals and insurgents to be extremely violent, hence, they can be equally seen as undesirables and enemies of any democratic and lawful state. In this sense therefore, many strategies which can work in one situation will undoubtedly be suitable for the other.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"We cannot continue with a policy of one step forward followed by two steps backward".³⁶

Hon Derrick Smith, MP, Minister of National Security

The organized crime situation in Jamaica requires urgent and appropriate action to curtail its adverse effects on the nation. The list of recommendations below provides a wide-ranging menu of suggestions which, if properly managed, administered, and controlled, may achieve much success. The key to the successful use of these recommendations is the realization that the implementation of each will require, more than one agency/institution working together to achieve the common goal. The partners include the Government of Jamaica, nongovernmental agencies, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (police), the Jamaica Defence Force (military), civic and human rights groups, and most importantly the populace.

As was seen in the study of the Malayan Emergency, three critical factors which led to British success, and which I propose would be important for success in Jamaica, were: the

development and use of a professional police intelligence unit (Special Branch); separating the criminals from the communities in which they find safe haven; and the organization of the management, administrative, and security efforts under one central body. The suggestions made in this section are those thought to be most achievable in a short to medium term.

- A joint governmental and security forces body should be established to do a study of how counterinsurgency measures were used to quell insurrections. This should form the basis of implementing a holistic approach, including community policing; social intervention in poor communities by the government; job creation; timely prosecution of offenders; weeding out corrupt politicians, police officers, and other civil servants; stemming the flow of illegal drugs in and out of the island; and stopping the entry of illegal weapons.
- Undertaking a public education campaign on the effects of crime and violence on the country and the benefits of reducing its occurrence. Simultaneously undertake a positive values and attitudes campaign throughout the nation.
- Increasing training and educational opportunities for vulnerable youths, especially males. This would result in the preparation of a cadre of younger and skilled workers who are better qualified to take advantage of employment opportunities available locally, regionally, and in North America or Europe.
- Providing mentorship and role modeling for vulnerable youths, especially males. Service clubs members and employees of respected and disciplined bodies like the JDF and JCF could be co-opted to perform these roles. Homework and extra lesson youth camps run by these groups may also be arranged to help the needy to perform better in school and learn social and coping skills.

- The monitoring of criminal deportees. This is especially important to assess the nature of crimes these deportees would have been involved in prior to their deportation and their likelihood of being involved in criminal activities in Jamaica. Deportees form one identifiable group which has been pointed out by the police as playing a lead role in organized criminal gangs. These gang leaders who have criminal experience in first world countries take with them sophisticated know-how which they impart to locals.
- Changing the laws to allow the use of plea bargaining. This suggestion has been moot in legal and other circles for years, but is yet to be implemented. Its possible usefulness in getting apprehended criminals to provide information or turn state witness against their cronies in exchange for lighter/reduced punishment makes its introduction overdue.
- Offering incentives for the public to give information on gang leaders, drug dealers, and criminals including those involved in extortion. This, along with plea bargaining and the confiscating the property they gained from their illegal activities, will help to deter some persons, who would otherwise have thought this an attractive venture.
- Offering protection and incentives to persons paying extortion money to provide information on the beneficiaries.
- Offering incentives for the public to give information on corrupt police officers, civil servants, and politicians.
- Constant surveillance and intelligence driven police and military operations in all criminal hot spot areas so as to prevent criminals from establishing safe heavens in the country by taking the fight to them.
- Holding oversight agencies responsible for the awarding and monitoring of government contracts responsible for seeing that these are done within the law. There are two existing

agencies which could undertake these functions in a more routine way: The Public Accounts Committee (of Parliament) and The Contractor General's Department. Where a breach of the law or corruption is detected, it is then prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecution, to the fullest extent of the law.

- Improving the intelligence gathering capabilities of the security forces. This must form one of the most important pillars for the eradicating of criminal gangs and their networks. As in the Malayan Emergency, this effort must be centrally led and administered. The JCF has a Special Branch which would need to be reorganized and strengthened to take on the lead role in this effort. In expanding the unit, international help must be sought with the vetting of new members to ensure the most suitable persons are recruited.

Other recommendations which could be approached from a more theoretically ideal viewpoint, and would need to be implemented on a more long term basis, include:

- Improve/increase the use of technology in crime solving and crime fighting. This is another area in which both the government and security forces often indicate that improvements are required. In situations where the technology is lacking, this must be addressed as there is a greater likelihood of criminal cases being placed before the courts with irrefutable evidence.
- Reforming the justice system to ensure speedier disposal of criminal cases. A study related to this was started about two years ago, but was put on hold by a previous administration. This need to be completed so recommendations can be made for implementation.

- Eradicating illegal drug cultivation and providing farming subsidies for former growers to undertake the farming of other crops. While doing so increase the provision of jobs so the poor are not easily swayed by handouts from criminals or influenced by the corrupt.
- Dismantling garrison communities by offering incentives to residents to move to other specially developed areas with their families. This task is probably one of the most difficult to undertake, and potentially one of the most explosive.
- Improving public amenities and infrastructure such as schools, roads, water, and electricity supplies in the poorer communities.
- Implementing programs to improve the integrity and professionalism of the security forces. This would include improving their conditions of employment and service including their pay and emoluments. It would then be reasonable to significantly increase the punishment for members found guilty of being involved in corruption, as it would then be as a result of greed rather than need.
- Seeking external assistance for providing advisors, technical support, material aid, investigative and intelligence skills, and funding. This is quite important as without such international expertise and resources successfully accomplishing this wide ranging set of government and security objectives is almost impossible.

CONCLUSION

*The crime situation now represents a serious challenge to the political, judicial, and law enforcement leaderships in the country; a situation which is not helped by the widespread corruption in the public and private sectors. It requires urgency, focus and seriousness of purpose.*³⁷

Hon Derrick Smith, MP, Minister of National Security

The strategies utilized by the government of Jamaica and the security forces have failed to limit or reduce the level of crime and violence plaguing the nation. Organized crime's

business lines such as extortion rackets, corruption, and the trafficking in drugs and weapons, are a threat to public safety and the health of the population. The country's people, economy, image, and reputation continue to suffer as crime spirals seemingly out of control. Many calls for the government and security forces to take action are met with measures lacking imagination and impact.

It seems evident also that the government is unwilling to allow the security forces enough freedom to take some of the tough measures that may be required in these circumstances. There may very soon come a time when the government has no choice. The corruption and violent behavior associated with criminal elites impairs the mechanism of government and damages a country's prospect for successful political and economic development.³⁸ Bearing in mind the failures of previous initiatives, a comprehensive plan which includes such tough measures is required. Quite often political leaders and others will comment that the country cannot afford the cost to implement the actions required to eradicate criminal gangs. What must seriously be considered, however, is whether the country can afford not to.

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APPENDIX A

JAMAICA: AN OVERVIEW

Jamaica is an island nation of the Greater Antilles, situated in the Caribbean Sea, approximately 150 miles in length and 50 miles wide. It is about 380 miles northeast of the Central American mainland, and 90 miles south of Cuba. Jamaica, which was a former Spanish possession known as *Santiago*, later became a British West Indies Crown colony but gained independence from Great Britain in 1962. With a population of approximately 2.7 million, it is the third most populous english speaking country in the Americas after the United States and Canada.

History and Culture

When Christopher Columbus “discovered” Jamaica in 1494, it was already settled mainly by South American Indians. He named it “Xaymaca,” meaning “Land of wood and water.” The British captured the island from the Spanish in 1655, and retained it until independence. Sugar production on the island and its location near to major trade routes made it a valuable possession for the early colonizers. African slaves and their descendants who were brought to Jamaica by the British have had a significant role in the development of its unique and diverse culture.

Demographically, the country’s ethnic groups are composed of 90% black and 10% mixed (white, Asian, East Indian). The religion is about 60% protestant and 40% mixed. Approximately 50% of the population lives in and around the major cities of Kingston and Montego Bay, and the Municipality of Portmore.

Economy

The economy of Jamaica has traditionally been based on agriculture especially sugarcane. Since independence bauxite mining and tourism has become the main sources of income. At

present it is estimated that approximately 65% of local industry is service based. Because the country is so import dependent however, it is vulnerable to external shocks. There is currently a 15% unemployment rate.

Government

The country has always enjoyed a healthy democratic system of government. The structure is based on the bicameral parliamentary, (Upper House – Senate, Lower House – House of Representatives) system adopted from Britain. The Constitution of Jamaica set the legal guiding principles by which all Jamaicans and non-Jamaicans in the country are required to abide. The laws of the land are also based on English Common Law, with three level of jurisdiction: The Magistrate/Supreme Court, The Court of Appeal, and the United Kingdom Privy Council (which is the final appellate body).

Jamaica is a member of several treaties and international organizations including the United Nations and the Commonwealth.

Source: Jamaica Information Service


APPENDIX B

MAP OF JAMAICA



Source: www.turq.com/maps/jamaicamapsm.gif

APPENDIX C
POPULAR TOURIST RESORT AREAS



Source: www.turq.com/maps/jamaicamapsm.gif

APPENDIX D

JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE: AN OVERVIEW

The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is primarily a light infantry organization charged with the defense of, and the maintenance of order, in the country – a very police-oriented mandate. It consists of one reserve and two regular infantry battalions, along with an engineer regiment, a support/logistic battalion, a small coast guard, and an equally small air wing. Formed in 1962, the JDF has developed based on the inherited customs and traditions of the British military, and it maintains these organizational and doctrinal similarities to the present day.

Roles and Responsibilities

Section 5 of the Defence Act (1962) states that “The Jamaica Defence Force shall be charged with the defense of and maintenance of order in Jamaica and with such other duties as may from time to time be defined by the Defence Board”. The JDF website’s Legal Status, Roles and Procedures section expounds on these other duties which include:

- To aid the civil power in the maintenance of law and order
- Assistance in the maintenance of essential services (electricity and water supplies, etc.)
- Assistance and protection of the population in the event of disaster
- Law enforcement, safety and environmental protection in Jamaica’s maritime zone
- Support of government sponsored programs whenever practicable, including environmental protection
- Search and rescue by air, land and sea
- Assistance to other Caribbean countries when requested and necessary, so as to restore law and order and, in the event of disaster, to assist and protect the civil population
- Military Ceremonial.

Throughout its history, the JDF has been intimately involved in joint operations with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to maintain law and order in the country; examples

illustrative of this were the state of emergency in Western Kingston from 2 October to 4 November 1966, the island-wide state of emergency in 1976, and the period of 1974 – 1994 governed by the “Suppression of Crimes Act”.

The Coast Guard (JDF CG) and Air Wing (JDF AW) are frequently called upon to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) missions for fishermen lost at sea, and to provide support for the infantry battalions. Over time, however (the last decade), the operations of the JDF CG and JDF AW have widened to include drug interdiction operations. The mandate of the JDF CG is even more important in the absence of a functional police maritime capability. Thus, the JDF CG is charged with executing the functions of the constabulary at sea, it is thus legally empowered to do so.

The JDF has come to the assistance of other Caribbean nations during times of political unrest and uncertainty (Grenada 1983, Trinidad 1990, and Haiti 1994-1996), as well as to bring relief from the effects of natural disasters. In summary the JDF has been the agency of “final resort” when all else fails; whether the situation be one of crime, natural disaster, industrial or social unrest, external/transnational threats, or environmental degradation. The nation has come to depend on the ability of the JDF to intervene and bring meaningful resolution to whatever crisis arises.

Source: Jamaica Defence Force

APPENDIX E

JAMAICA CONSTABULARY FORCE: AN OVERVIEW

The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) was established in 1865, based on a British model, but has undergone several organizational changes throughout its history. In its current disposition, it is headed by the Commissioner of Police and is organized around the four broad portfolios of operations, administration and support services, crime, and special projects; each headed by a Deputy Commissioner.

Operationally, the JCF is organized upon the basic unit called a Division, commanded by a Deputy Superintendent, Superintendent, or Senior Superintendent. A cluster of 4-5 Divisions makes up an Area which is commanded by an Assistant Commissioner or Senior Superintendent of Police. The Area or Division has specific responsibility for a geographical area and are further broken down into smaller zones which are served by police stations (like precincts).

These Divisions are supported by a number of police agencies which may be superimposed upon them, either working independently or in support. These include the Special Branch (intelligence gathering and dissemination), Crime Management Unit, Fraud Squad, Forensic Laboratory, Bureau of Special Investigation, Canine Division, Protective Services, and the National Firearm and Drug Intelligence Center, among others.

Roles and Responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities of the force are summarized in Section 13 of the Jamaica Constabulary Act as: "The duties of the Police under this act shall be to keep the watch by day and night; to preserve the peace; to detect crime; apprehend or summon before a Justice, persons found committing any offence, or whom they reasonably suspect of having committed any offence; to serve and execute all summonses, warrants, subpoenas, notices and criminal process

issued by any Justice in a criminal matter, and to do and perform all duties appertaining to the office of Constable.”

Simply put, the JCF is the government agency tasked with the primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in the island. The motto of the JCF is: “To Serve, Protect, Reassure.” It currently has a strength of approximately 8,000 members.

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force

APPENDIX F

JAMAICAN CRIME STATISTICS 2006

| Category | Statistics | Ranking* |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| Assaults | 10883 | [30th of 57] |
| Burglaries | 2426 | [44th of 54] |
| Car thefts | 258 | [50th of 55] |
| Murders | 1340 | [17th of 62] |
| Murders (per capita) | 0.479 per 1,000 people | [3rd of 62] |
| Prisoners | 4744 prisoners | [95th of 164] |
| Rapes | 1304 | [22nd of 65] |
| Rapes (per capita) | 0.476608 per 1,000 people | [6th of 65] |
| Total crimes | 31988 | [47th of 60] |
| Total crimes (per capita) | 14.3231 per 1,000 people | [37th of 60] |

* The ranking refers to Jamaica's position relative to all the countries for which statistics were available in 2006

Source: nationmaster.com

APPENDIX G

TASK FORCE/SPECIAL SQUAD/OPERATION 1960s-2007

The list below is a compilation of the various task forces, special squads and operations, we have on record as being established between the 1960s and 2007, to fight crime in Jamaica.

On many occasions more than one of these groups or operations was in use at the same time.

- Police Mobile Reserves
- Operations Base
- Echo Squad
- Special Anticrime Task Force
- Organized Crime Unit
- Organized Crime Investigation Division
- Crime Management Unit
- Operation Ardent
- Operation Shining Armor
- Operation Intrepid Curtail
- Operation Kingfish

Source: Compiled from internal JDF files

APPENDIX H

GARRISON COMMUNITY LOCATIONS (2007)

| <u>City/Town</u> | <u>Number of Garrisons</u> |
|--|----------------------------|
| Kingston | 26 |
| Spanish Town (and environs) | 11 |
| May Pen | 7 |
| Montego Bay (and environs) | 15 |
| Savanna-la-mar | 3 |
| Portmore | 5 |
| Miscellaneous (areas not in a city/town, informal settlements) | 10 |
| Total | 87 |

Garrison Community: In the 1960s the government began the development of new housing schemes in which the units were allocated to supporters of the governing party. Political garrison communities were therefore started and replicated during successive administrations. The community residents then became indebted to the political leaders and thus could be easily influenced to ensure the party remained in control of the community and thus remain in power. As economic restructuring reduced the capacity of politicians to give handouts in these communities, they turned to a whole gamut of illegal activities to sustain their livelihood. The politician lost his/her influence and so these activities are generally under the control of an "area leader" or "don".

Source: Compiled from information provided by the JCF

APPENDIX I

MURDER RATES IN JAMAICA 1996-2007

| Year | Number of murders |
|------|-------------------|
| 1996 | 925 |
| 1997 | 1038 |
| 1998 | 953 |
| 1999 | 849 |
| 2000 | 887 |
| 2001 | 1139 |
| 2002 | 1045 |
| 2003 | 971 |
| 2004 | 1471 |
| 2005 | 1674 |
| 2006 | 1340 |
| 2007 | 1574 |

Source: Compiled from information provided by the JCF

APPENDIX J

GLOSSARY

Organized Crime: Organized crime or criminal organizations are groups or operations run by criminals, most commonly for the purpose of generating a monetary profit. Criminal organizations keep illegal activities secret, and members communicate mainly by word of mouth. Hence the police are hardly likely to be able to trace phone calls or letters. Many organized crime operations have legal fronts, such as building construction, which operate in parallel with and provide cover for drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion, murder for hire, and fraud. Other criminal operations engage in political corruption, political violence, terrorism, abduction, prison break, and crimes against humanity.

Garrison Community: In the 1960s the government began the development of new housing schemes in which the units were allocated to supporters of the governing party. Political garrison communities were therefore started and replicated during successive administrations. The community residents then became indebted to the political leaders and thus could be easily influenced to ensure the party remained in control of the community and thus remain in power. As economic restructuring reduced the capacity of politicians to give handouts in these communities, they turned to a whole gamut of illegal activities to sustain their livelihood. The politician lost his/her influence and so these activities are generally under the control of an "area leader" or "don".

Corruption: In its narrower and more legalistic meaning it denotes the payment of bribes for the award of contracts or the performance of functions. It is also the misuse of office, position or power, or the exercise of discretion, or influence for personal gain or partisan advantage.

Insurgency: An insurgency is defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.

Counterinsurgency: This is a military term for the combat against a political rebellion, or insurgency, by forces aligned with the standing government of the territory in which the operations are occurring.

Centre of Gravity: Those characteristics, capabilities and sources of power from which a military force (or non-state actor) derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.

Public Accounts Committee: The Houses of Parliament website refers to this committee as "undoubtedly the most important of all Sessional Select Committees." Its terms of reference are set out in Order 69 of the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives of Jamaica, 1964. It has the duties of examining the following:

- The accounts showing the appropriations of the sums granted by the Legislature to meet public expenditure;
- Such accounts as may be referred to the Committee by the House or under any law; and

- The Report of the Auditor General on any such accounts.

In addition, all Accounts and Financial Statements laid upon the Table of the House in respect of Statutory Boards, Public Corporations and Public Companies in which the Government hold majority shares are deemed to be automatically referred to the Public Accounts Committee for examination and report.

The membership of the Public Accounts Committee is comprised of members from the two major political parties represented in the House. Traditionally, the Committee is chaired by the Opposition's Spokesman on Finance. Both the Auditor General and his team of officers and officers from the Ministry of Finance attend PAC meetings. As it is chaired by the opposition, which has a vested, if not ulterior motive, for finding and exposing government mismanagement and corruption, it can be quite probing in its work and is subjected to extensive publicity both in the print and electronic media.

Contractor General's Department: This is a watchdog agency for the proper and legal awarding of government contracts. The website of the Contractor General Department states that its mission is to effectively discharge the requirements of the Contractor-General Act and, in so doing, to:

- Monitor and investigate the award and implementation of contracts, licenses, permits, concessions and the divestment of government assets;
- Improve and make fair and equitable the system of awarding contracts, licenses, permits, concessions and the divestment of government assets;
- Ensure that all public sector agencies give the widest possible opportunity to qualified persons to bid for contracts and divestments or to apply for licenses and permits;
- Create a positive image of the public procurement process by promoting integrity, professionalism, transparency, efficiency and, in so doing, to thereby engender public confidence.

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